The EU and the War in Gaza: A Challenge to European Efforts to Safeguard Human Rights and Democracy

The European Union’s efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the Middle East have faced an unprecedented challenge in the wake of the war in Gaza. The EU’s response to the war has been widely criticized as incoherent and ineffective, which cast doubts on its credibility as a meaningful actor in the region. In June 2025, the EU concluded that Israel had violated its human rights obligations under the Association Agreement which governs trading and cooperation between the two sides. Israel’s plans to expand the settlement construction in the West Bank and its talk of annexation have directly challenged the EU’s aspiration to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. Israeli settlers have also attacked Palestinian communities in the West Bank with the encouragement of extremist Israeli ministers. The human rights violations, Israel’s policy in the West Bank and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza over the summer resulted in rising calls within the EU for the imposition of punitive measures against Israel.

Yet the rising clamour for sanctions against Israel have also laid bare the divisions within the EU over its policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. In September 2025, the EU finally approved sanctions against extremist Israeli ministers and settlers as well as the suspension of EU trade preferences. Yet these measures have not been implemented because numerous member states are opposed to them. On 20 October, the
EU decided to pause the measures in response to the Trump administration’s peace plan. In the event that the peace efforts break down, Israel pursues policies that harm the long term prospects of a two state solution, and the EU adopts a more confrontational approach towards Israel, the Visegrad countries, including Czechia, will face growing scrutiny.

THE EU HAS LEVERAGE WITH ISRAEL BUT CAN IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

The charge that the EU is irrelevant when it comes to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians was already being voiced within days of the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, 2023. This scepticism is linked in large part to the belief that the EU is hamstrung by divisions and unable to speak with a united coherent voice when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The EU has significant leverage with Israel as its largest trade partner, but up until 2025, it has been reluctant to utilize it. However, during 2025, the EU has reviewed Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and found that certain actions taken by the Israeli government violated core elements relating to the safeguarding of human rights and democratic principles. These actions were related to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza following Israel’s military intervention, the blocking of humanitarian aid to Gaza, the escalation of Israeli military operations and Israel’s decision to advance the settlement plan in the so-called E1 area of the West Bank, which damages the future prospects of the two-state solution.

In September, the EU Commission proposed suspending certain trade-related provisions of the agreement. Besides proposing further sanctions against Hamas, it also supported taking measures against violent Israeli settlers and extremist ministers in the Israeli government. A number of EU member states have also recognized a Palestinian State. However, the move to recognize a Palestinian State is only symbolic in nature and does little to change the situation on the ground for the Palestinians. It has also alienated many Israelis, including those who are critical of the government’s actions, because such a recognition is viewed as a reward for Hamas, which remains in control in Gaza and is strengthening its control over the local population.

Nevertheless, there are some signs that the EU threats to impose sanctions have rattled the Israeli government. For example, in a controversial speech in mid-September, Israel’s prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu admitted that Israel was in a “type of isolation.” He asserted that Israel had to behave like “Sparta”. In his address, Netanyahu remarked, “Can we get out of this isolation? Yes – I am a devotee of the free market, but we'll have to have some signs of an autarky.”

Yet in the wake of the Trump administration’s ceasefire plan which was announced in early October, the EU has decided to withhold the threat of sanctions. The EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas noted the “divergent views” on the sanctions, and stated,“we don’t move with the measures now, but we don’t take them off the table either because the situation is fragile.” Some critics of the move have argued that the EU may be
squandering its leverage.5 Nevertheless, even without the Trump administration’s plan, it is unclear whether the measures could be implemented because of the opposition of some individual member states to them. The sanctions on trade with Israel, for example, require the support of a qualified majority in order to be implemented, and member states such as Germany and Austria remain unsupportive of such measures. The sanctions against the far right Israeli ministers are more problematic still since they require the unanimous support of all the EU member states. Among the Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have expressed opposition to the sanctions on trade with Israel and maintain close ties with Israel’s prime minister Netanyahu.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CZECH FOREIGN POLICY

Czechia is likely to maintain its strong support for Israel even if most EU member states decide to support punitive measures against the country. It has traditionally avoided criticizing Israeli policy publicly, believing that it is counterproductive to do so. However, an Israeli move to resume the war in Gaza or to accelerate the establishment of settlements in the West Bank is liable to heighten EU resolve for sanctions against
the country. In such a scenario, the Czech opposition to punitive measures could bring the country’s policy under greater scrutiny, especially if other Visegrad countries drop their opposition to the sanctions.

Andrej Babiš returned to power in Czechia in October 2025. Babiš is a strong admirer and supporter of Netanyahu. After inaugurating the Jerusalem office of the embassy of the Czech Republic in Israel in March 2021, Babiš stated: “the reason why I came here to Israel is to learn about your experience. Under the guidance of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, [a] great leader, the State of Israel has become the example to follow”. He is a close ally of Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, who has also shown consistent support for Israel and opposition to sanctions against Israel. However, it is far from certain that Orban will win the elections that are due to take place in Hungary in April 2026. A change of leadership in Hungary could potentially lead to a different policy towards Israel. In such a scenario, Czechia could find itself increasingly exposed.

FORESIGHT: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S PEACE PLAN IS LIKELY TO CONSTRAIN EUROPE

As long as the Trump administration is committed to advancing its peace plan and the ceasefire continues, the EU can be expected to support the plan and refrain from imposing sanctions on Israel. It is noteworthy that President Trump exerted significant pressure on the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza and halt its plans to annex the West Bank territory. The EU’s preference will be to maintain the threat of sanctions while supporting efforts to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and contribute to Gaza’s stabilization and reconstruction. Moreover, the fact that the EU is the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA) gives it unique leverage in advancing reforms in the PA. This, in turn, potentially strengthens the possibility of the PA becoming involved in Gaza’s future governance.

However, in the event that Israel resumes its war in Gaza, and the possibility of a twostate solution recedes further into the distance, amid Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank and renewed Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis, the divisions within the EU over the question of punitive measures against Israel are likely to increase. Czechia will also need to consider how it will position itself in this scenario.

→ While the EU has significant leverage with Israel as its largest trading partner, its ability to utilize it is likely to remain limited because of the continued divisions over policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. The most effective means for the EU to play a role in this case is through its experience in state building and encouraging reform in the Palestinian Authority.

→ As long as the Trump administration remains committed to achieving progress with its peace plan, the EU can be expected to continue supporting it and refrain from imposing punitive measures against Israel.

→ Czechia’s policy towards Israel and the Palestinians is liable to come under greater scrutiny in the event that other Visegrad countries show a greater readiness to support EU measures against Israel.