The EU’s Dilemma Regarding the Western Balkans

INTRODUCTION

The Western Balkans (WB) is one of the regions where the EU’s role as a democracy-promoting actor is being tested. Unlike in the EU relations with Eastern Europe or more distant regions with which Brussels engages primarily through development aid, trade, or diplomatic instruments, in the relations with the WB the promise of EU accession is the EU’s central leverage. Yet over the years, this conditionality has weakened
due to enlargement fatigue and the (perceived) inconsistent assessment of the progress made by the countries in the region.

Additionally, the war in Ukraine and the following shifting geopolitical dynamics have given local elites in the WB room to instrumentalize the process and their relationship with the EU. In countries like Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments publicly commit to reforms while consolidating authoritarian practices. Thus, they exploit the EU’s reluctance to escalate pressure, especially in these times of geopolitical uncertainties related to Russia. Civil society groups across the region depend on EU funding to counter democratic backsliding, but their influence is limited without stronger political backing from Brussels.

The analysis focuses on the EU’s main challenge in the Balkans: balancing strategic stability with democratic transformation. This chapter argues that in its attempt to maintain this balance, the EU is constrained (by both local elites and geopolitical shifts) and thus misses political opportunities for democratic changes. Thus, the WB shows the EU’s core dilemma: how to reconcile geopolitical pragmatism with a genuine commitment to democratic transformation. This dilemma, nevertheless, represents an opportunity for Czechia, as Prague has been a consistent proponent of the WB’s European integration, yet would not support its integration if it were at the cost of no reforms or a compromise that would harm the bloc.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has made collective defence a priority for the EU (Bechev, 2025), which has affected its foreign policy paradigm as the WB is now seen as a bigger priority. For the first time, 30 years after the Dayton Peace Accords, the region has the potential to turn from a consumer into a provider of security and contribute to the European security and defence (Ibid.). “We want to count on Serbia”,said President Ursula von der Leyen during her most recent visit to Belgrade in October 2025 (European Commission, 2025).

Within the EU, the future of the WB is a topic of multiple discussions concerning geopolitics, conditionality, and possible internal reforms. These discussions largely affect the institutional thinking that concerns the enlargement process. There are two contrasting points on how to proceed – the EU could accelerate the enlargement now, or follow a “reform first”-approach, meaning that both the EU and the WB countries
should reform themselves before new members are admitted into the block. In such debates, the WB’s democratic backsliding remains a key concern. There are also voices advocating for a phased membership, where a gradual integration would offer incentives to candidate states without overstretching the EU itself.

The genuine integration of the WB into the EU policies – whether through a full membership or a more gradual and flexible methodology – has been challenged by the EU’s perceived ‘stabilitocracy’ efforts (Bieber, 2018). Persistent democratic backsliding and state capture that remain without a reaction from the EU continue to undermine the rule of law, media freedom, and overall democratic governance in the WB (European Western Balkans, 2025).

Before and even more so after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU has prioritized stability over democratic reforms in the way it treated the countries of the Western Balkans. The EU politicians’ relations with the region have intensified as a sign of their commitment. But the EU’s tolerance for local political actors not pursuing democratic reforms and instead jeopardizing rule of law and human rights, has normalized the authoritarian tendencies in the WB over the years. To detach itself from this image, the EU cannot rely on cooperating with local political actors in power who have benefited from antagonizing it. The political establishment in Serbia, the largest country in the WB, have set trends that other politicians in the region replicate, particularly the approach of transactional balancing between Russia and the West. Serbia’s maintaining of simultaneous relationships with Russia, China, the EU, and the US has not been the product of the strategic vision for Serbia’s population, but it has secured the regime’s survival (Dufalla & Metodieva, 2024).

The EU enlargement is a key opportunity for the Western Balkans to gradually depart from political and economic stagnation. However, the current geopolitical climate, shaped by the war in Ukraine, complicates the expected integration trajectory. The war has shifted the EU’s focus towards immediate security concerns, potentially deferring enlargement initiatives despite the strategic imperative of integrating the Western Balkans to counter the growing external influences in the region (Kapidžić et al., 2024; Metodieva, 2024). If the EU shows hesitation regarding the prospects of the enlargement, this will make the WB countries even more vulnerable to external geopolitical influences.

Currently, the bloc faces uncertainty regarding its transatlantic relations while dealing with the war in Ukraine, both militarily and politically. Against this background, the EU has the expectation that the WB countries on their European path should align their foreign policies with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the bloc regarding Russia, but not China. China’s influence in the Western Balkans grows, raisin fears that new member states could act as promoters of Chinese interests and veto actions against Beijing in the EU (Shopov, 2025).

Balkan leaders use Chinese financing to bypass the democratic conditions tied to EU accession, often delaying or reversing their countries’ reform commitments (Ibid.). This is a problem that the bloc fails to acknowledge and act upon. The relationship between China and the EU, whether they cooperate or not, will influence the EU enlargement process, potentially affecting both its quality and its scope. China’s influence in the region may play a role in whether and how the WB countries proceed with their membership process or some other form of integration into the EU institutions, as the EU will seek to adjust to a new geopolitical and economic reality where the US is not a key partner anymore.

The EU, now driven by the desire to avoid any security risks in its immediate neighborhood, prioritizes the accession of Albania and Montenegro, which have shown consistency in their commitment. Presenting the European Commission’s annual reports on EU candidate countries, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos told the European Parliament that there is strong support for the enlargement of the European Union and that 2025 has been a good year for some candidate countries (Popović, 2025). “Reforms pay off, and that should serve as additional motivation for other candidate countries,” Kos said. The EU will soon begin preparations for the accession treaty with Montenegro.

Over the past year, the EU has strengthened the WB countries’ gradual integration through various instruments for the Western Balkans, such as the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, visa liberalization and mobility initiatives, and the integration of the energy market. But the gradual integration should be consistent. Otherwise, countries left in the ‘waiting room’, particularly Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, may increasingly turn towards alternative geopolitical alignments. The success of the new
EU approach depends on whether the EU can manage expectations and provide clear
pathways for the eventual full membership of all the WB countries. The key challenge,
though, is to prevent further democratic backsliding and counter the rise of a nationalism
that employs anti-EU narratives.

OPPORTUNITIES/CHALLENGES FOR CZECH FOREIGN POLICY

First, the gradual integration approach is an opportunity for Czechia to invest in and cooperate more closely with partners in the Western Balkans, particularly in markets such as energy, IT, and other expanding sectors, where Czech expertise and investments can have an impact. The geographic proximity also allows for the development of more circular migration policies with the Western Balkan countries while also considering the potential of labour migration or a labour exchange between the Western Balkans and Czechia (Karabegović, 2020).

Second, because the EU enlargement requires the unanimous approval of all the member states, Czechia’s role in this case is not only economic, but also diplomatic and political. Prague has maintained a constructive stance within the EU when it comes to the integration of the Western Balkans, and thus, the country can shape the pace and direction of the enlargement process by being a consistent and pragmatic voice. In a way, the EU enlargement represents a diplomatic opportunity for Czechia to further engage with sensitive issues such as the political dynamics between Bulgaria and North Macedonia and the need for constitutional changes in Skopje that would let the country move forward (Metodieva & Keranov 2024).

Finally, since Czechia is often perceived as a constructive member state without any political baggage or the kinds of disputes that complicate other EU members’ stances, Prague can promote a pro-EU agenda from a Central European perspective that contrasts with Hungary’s approach to the Western Balkans, which is seen as incentivizing corruption and political clientelism.

FORESIGHT

Whether the EU enlargement will continue as a more gradual process or follow a geopolitical logic with acceleration elements, the EU’s dilemma regarding the Western Balkans will persist.

Brussels’ approach to the region, particularly its willingness to shift from elite-level diplomacy towards direct engagement with grassroots democratic forces and civil society, is decisive in this case. This direct engagement is crucial for fostering democratic transformation and counteracting authoritarian tendencies as well as external influences.

If the pace of EU enlargement across the Western Balkans is uneven, this may present a critical uncertainty: an accelerated progress for Montenegro and Albania while potentially leaving behind Serbia, Bosnia, or North Macedonia, may provoke political resentment and trigger regional instability.

Based on Serbia’s recent experience with the massive student protests there, we can say that grassroots democratic movements and their ability to mobilize public support are key to resisting domestic political pressures and external influences, and thus keep political elites on track with democratic reforms. To make sure that this is not wishful or naive thinking, countries like Czechia can be more active in and also vocal about supporting EU initiatives that empower constructive voices in the WB and also keep maintaining a consistent pro-enlargement stance.

→ The EU’s stability-first approach has enabled authoritarian tendencies in the Western Balkans.

→ External actors, particularly Russia and China, will continue exploiting the EU’s moments of hesitation regarding the enlargement.

→ A gradual engagement process is essential to stopping further democratic backsliding in the WB, and Czechia can play a key role in it.